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This paper analyzes the role of transparency and credibility in accounting for the widely divergent
macroeconomic effects of three episodes of deliberate monetary contraction: the post-Civil War deflation,
the post-WWI deflation, and the Volcker disinflation. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model
in which private agents use optimal filtering to infer the central bank's nominal anchor, we demonstrate
that the salient features of these three historical episodes can be explained by differences in the design
and transparency of monetary policy, even without any time variation in economic structure or model
parameters. For a policy regime with relatively high credibility, our analysis highlights the benefits
of a gradualist approach (as in the 1870s) rather than a sudden change in policy (as in 1920-21). In
contrast, for a policy institution with relatively low credibility (such as the Federal Reserve in late
1980), an aggressive policy stance can play an important signalling role by making the policy shift
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Since at least the time of David Hume (1752) in the mid-18th century, it has been recognized
that episodes of deﬂation or disinﬂation may have costly implications for the real economy, and
much attention has been devoted to assessing how policy should be conducted to reduce such
costs. The interest of prominent classical economists in these questions, including Hume, Thornton,
and Ricardo, was spurred by practical policy debates about how to return to the gold standard
following episodes of pronounced wartime inﬂation.1 Drawing on limited empirical evidence, these
authors tried to identify factors that contributed to the real cost of deﬂation, including those factors
controlled by policy. They advocated that a deﬂation should be implemented gradually, if at all;
in a similar vein a century later, Keynes (1923) and Irving Fisher (1920) discussed the dangers
of trying to quickly reverse the large runup in prices that occurred during World War I and its
aftermath.
While the modern literature has provided substantial empirical evidence to support the case that
deﬂations or disinﬂations are often quite costly, there is less agreement about the underlying factors
that may have contributed to high real costs in some episodes, or that might explain pronounced
diﬀerences in costs across episodes.2 Indeed, disagreement about the factors principally responsible
for inﬂuencing the costs of disinﬂation helped fuel contentious debates about the appropriate way to
reduce inﬂation during the 1970s and early 1980s. Many policymakers and academics recommended
a policy of gradualism–reﬂecting the view that the costs of disinﬂation were largely due to structural
persistence in wage and price setting–while others recommended aggressive monetary tightening on
the grounds that the credibility of monetary policy in the 1970s had sunk too low for gradualism
to be a viable approach.
In this paper, we examine three notable episodes of deliberate monetary contraction: the post-
Civil War deﬂation, the post-WWI deﬂation, and the Volcker disinﬂation. One goal of our paper
is to use these episodes to illuminate the factors that inﬂuence the costs of monetary contractions.
1Humphrey (2004) provides an excellent survey of the views of leading classical economists regarding the macroe-
conomic eﬀects of deﬂation and the associated challenges for policymakers.
2For example, see Gordon (1982), Taylor (1983), and Ball (1994a).
1These episodes provide a fascinating laboratory for this analysis, insofar as they exhibit sharp
diﬀerences in the policy actions undertaken, in the credibility and transparency of the policies, and
in the ultimate eﬀects on inﬂation and output. Our second objective is to evaluate the ability of a
variant of the New Keynesian model that has performed well in ﬁtting certain features of post-war
U.S. data to account for these historical episodes.
Our paper begins by providing a historical overview of each of these episodes. In the decade
following the Public Credit Act of 1869, which set a 10 year timetable for returning to the Gold
standard, the price level declined gradually by 30 percent, while real output grew at a robust 4-5
percent per year. We argue that the highly transparent policy objective, the credible nature of
the authorities’ commitment, and gradual implementation of the policy helped minimize disruptive
eﬀects on the real economy. By contrast, while prices fell by a similar magnitude during the
deﬂation that began in 1920, the price decline was very rapid, and accompanied by a sharp fall
in real activity. We interpret the large output contraction as attributable to the Federal Reserve’s
abrupt departure from the expansionary policies that had prevailed until that time; fortunately,
because the ultimate policy objective was clear (reducing prices enough to raise gold reserves), the
downturn was fairly short-lived. Finally, the Volcker disinﬂation succeeded in reducing inﬂation
from double digit rates in the late 1970s to a steady 4 percent by 1983, though at the cost of a severe
and prolonged recession. We argue that the substantial costs of this episode on the real economy
reﬂected the interplay both of nominal rigidities, and the lack of policy credibility following the
unstable monetary environment of the previous 15 years.
We next attempt to measure policy predictability during each of the three episodes in order to
quantify the extent to which each deﬂation was anticipated by economic agents. For the two earlier
periods, we construct a proxy for price level forecast errors by using commodity futures data and
realized spot prices. While these commodity price forecast errors provide very imperfect measures of
errors in forecasting the general price level, we believe that they provide useful characterizations of
the level of policy uncertainty during each period: in particular, the commodity price forecast errors
in the early 1920s were much larger and more persistent than in the 1870s. This pattern conﬁrms
other evidence on policy predictability during each episode taken from bond yields, contemporary
2narrative accounts, and informal surveys. Finally, for the Volcker period, we utilize direct measures
of survey expectations on inﬂation to construct inﬂation forecast errors, and show that forecast
errors were large and extremely persistent, suggesting a high degree of uncertainty about the
Federal Reserve’s policy objectives.
We then examine whether a relatively standard DGSE model is capable of accounting for these
diﬀerent episodes. The model that we employ is a slightly simpliﬁed version of the models used
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). Thus, our model
incorporates staggered nominal wage and price contracts with random duration, as in Calvo (1983)
and Yun (1996), and incorporates various real rigidities including investment adjustment costs
and habit persistence in consumption. The structure of the model is identical across periods, aside
from the characterization of monetary policy. In particular, we assume that the monetary authority
targets the price level in the two earlier episodes, consistent with the authorities desire to reinstate
or support the Gold standard; by contrast, we assume that the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor-
style interest rate reaction function in the Volcker period, responding to the diﬀerence between
inﬂation and its target value. Moreover, we assume that agents had imperfect information about
the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target during the Volcker episode, and had to infer the underlying
target through solving a signal extraction problem.
We ﬁnd that our simple model performs remarkably well in accounting for each of the three
episodes. Notably, the model is able to track the sharp but transient decline in output during the
1920s, as well as generate a substantial recession in response to the monetary tightening under
Volcker. More generally, we interpret the overall success of our model in ﬁtting these disparate
episodes as reﬂecting favorably on the ability of the New Keynesian model – augmented with some
of the dynamic complications suggested in the recent literature – to ﬁt important business cycle
facts. However, one important twist is our emphasis on the role of incomplete information in
accounting for the range of outcomes.
Finally, we use counterfactual simulations of our model to evaluate the consequences of alter-
native strategies for implementing a new nominal target (i.e., either a lower price level, or a lower
inﬂation rate). We ﬁnd that under a highly transparent policy regime, a new nominal target can
3be achieved with minimal fallout on the real economy, provided the implementation occurs over a
period of at least 3-4 years. In this vein, we use model simulations to show that a more predictable
policy of gradual deﬂation – as occurred in the 1870s – could have helped avoid the sharp post-
WWI downturn. However, our analysis of the Volcker period emphasizes that the strong argument
for gradualism under a transparent and credible monetary regime becomes less persuasive if the
monetary regime lacks credibility. In this lower credibility case, an aggressive policy stance can play
an important signalling role insofar as it makes a policy shift – such as a reduction in the inﬂation
target – more apparent to private agents. Because inﬂation expectations adjust more rapidly than
under a gradualist policy stance, output can rebound more quickly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the three episodes, while Section
3 examines empirical evidence on the evolution of expectations during each episode. Section 4
outlines the model, and Section 5 describes the calibration. Section 6 matches the model to the
salient features of the three episodes, and considers counterfactual policy experiments. Section 8
concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Post-Civil War Episode
Given the high cost of ﬁnancing the Civil War, the U.S. government suspended gold convertibility
in 1862 and issued ﬁat money (”greenbacks”). The monetary base expanded dramatically in the
subsequent two years, precipitating a sharp decline in the value of greenbacks relative to gold. The
dollar price of a standard ounce of gold rose from its oﬃcial price of $20.67 that had prevailed since
1834 to over $40 by 1864 (the lower panel of Figure 1 shows an index of the greenback price of
gold relative to its oﬃcial price of $20.67). Despite some retracing in the late stages of the war, the
dollar price of gold remained about 50 percent above its oﬃcial price by the cessation of hostilities
in mid-1865.
Following the war, there was widespread support for reverting to a specie standard at the pre-
war parity. In the parlance of the period, this meant eliminating the “gold premium,” the diﬀerence
between the market price of gold and the oﬃcial price. Using simple quantity theory reasoning,
4Figure 1: The Post-Civil War Deﬂation
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policymakers regarded monetary tightening as the appropriate instrument for achieving this ob-
jective: if the overall price level fell suﬃciently, the dollar price of gold would drop, and the gold
premium eventually disappear. Accordingly, Congress passed the Contraction Act in April 1866,
with the backing of President Johnson. This act instructed the U.S. Treasury – the eﬀective mone-
tary authority during that period - to retire the supply of greenbacks. Given initial public support
for a quick return to convertibility, the Treasury proceeded aggressively, reducing the monetary
base about 20 percent between 1865 and 1867. However, the sharp price deﬂation that ensued had
a contractionary impact on the economy, with certain sectors experiencing disproportionate eﬀects
(e.g., heavily leveraged farmers). Thus, Congress and President Johnson were forced to temporarily
suspend monetary tightening in the face of strong public protest (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).
President Grant promised to renew the march toward resumption when he delivered his ﬁrst
inaugural in March 1869, but with the important diﬀerence that the deﬂation would be gradual. The
president received key legislative support with the passage of the Public Credit Act of 1869, which
5pledged that the Federal Government would repay its debt in specie within ten years. The long
timeframe reﬂected the new political imperative of a gradualist approach. With further monetary
contraction deemed infeasible, supporters of resumption planned to keep the money stock roughly
constant, and allow prices to fall slowly as the economy expanded. This philosophy helped guide
legislation, and in turn the U.S. Treasury’s operational procedures for conducting monetary policy.
Thus, Treasury policy kept the monetary base fairly constant through most of the 1870s, oﬀsetting
the issuance of National Bank notes with the retirement of Greenbacks. The Treasury’s ability to
adhere to this policy was facilitated by the passage of the Resumption Act in 1875, which sealed
January 1, 1879 as the date of resumption of convertibility, and by the election of the hard-money
Republican candidate Rutherford Hayes in the 1876 election.
As seen in the upper-left panel of Figure 1, these policies succeeded in producing a fairly smooth
and continuous decline in the aggregate price level, and allowed the authorities to comfortably meet
the January 1879 deadline for the resumption of specie payments. Furthermore, as shown in the
upper-right panel, all three of the available measures of real output grew at a fairly rapid and
steady pace over the period from 1869 to 1872. Of course, the worldwide ﬁnancial panic of 1873
had marked consequences for U.S. markets and economic activity; nevertheless, real output growth
over the decade of the 1870s was remarkably strong, averaging about 4 to 5 percent per year.3
This strong economic growth in the face of persistent deﬂation seems to have been made possible
because of the slow and fairly predictable nature of the price decline between the passage of the
Public Credit Act in 1869 and resumption a decade later. Two factors played an important role in
making the price decline predictable. First, the ultimate objective of restoring the gold price to its
oﬃcial (pre-war) level was highly credible. This served to anchor expectations about the long-run
expected price level within a fairly narrow range, so that uncertainty about the future price level
mainly reﬂected uncertainty about the path of the real value of gold (in terms of goods). Second,
it was clear after 1868 that the target of restoring convertibility would be achieved gradually. As
3As seen in Figure 1, available output measures suggest that growth was relatively strong throughout the period
surrounding the passage of the Public Credit Act in 1869. In particular, Davis’ (2004) industrial production series
(which is available prior to 1869, the year the GDP series begin) grows at about 6 percent per year between 1867 and
1873, notwithstanding about a 25 percent appreciation of the dollar relative to gold and major foreign currencies.
6discussed above, there was little support in Congress for returning to the rapid pace of monetary
contraction that followed the Civil War.
Our contention that the policy of restoring gold convertibility at the oﬃcial pre-war price was
highly credible may seem diﬃcult to reconcile with the political agitation in favor of Greenbacks
that seemed a salient feature of the 1870s. But support for the Gold standard – both within the U.S.
government, and the public at large – remained extremely strong in the post-Civil War period, so
that the net eﬀect of the political agitation was simply to graduate progress towards convertibility.4
This support for resumption stemmed in part from historical precedent: the United States had been
on a specie standard for almost its entire history, dating to the passage of the Coinage Act of 1792.
It also reﬂected deeply-seated views about how a specie standard protected private property rights
against unjust seizure, which was regarded as a moral and political imperative.
Overall, this analysis suggests that it is appropriate to characterize the U.S. deﬂation experience
over at least the 1869-79 period as one in which both the ﬁnal objective of policy was transparent and
credible, and which implied a fairly clear path for the overall price level. Moreover, the authorities
appeared to place a large weight on minimizing the adverse consequences to the real economy, and
hence were content to achieve convertibility gradually in an environment of predictable deﬂation.5
2.2 The Post-WWI Episode
The U.S. government suspended the gold standard de facto shortly after it entered World War I and
began an enormous arms build-up that fueled inﬂation. President Wilson ordered the suspension
and placed an embargo on the export of gold in order to protect the country’s stock. In the absence
of the embargo, high inﬂation likely would have triggered large outﬂows of gold: GNP prices rose
almost 40 percent while the U.S. was at war, which was equal to the cumulative increase in prices
4The restoration of specie convertibility was supported by all three branches of government. It had the enthusiastic
backing of the three successive Republican presidents who held oﬃce during the period (Johnson, Grant, and Hayes),
and, through its decisions, the indirect support of the Supreme Court. While there was less unanimity in Congress,
especially after the 1873 Panic, the debate hinged more on the appropriate speed of restoring convertibility at the
oﬃcial price, rather than on the ultimate goal.
5There was admittedly some uncertainty about what the target for the dollar price of gold implied for the long-run
price level, i.e., for how much price deﬂation would ultimately have to take place. However, while the real price of
gold rose through the 1870s, it seems unlikely that this slow and steady rise signiﬁcantly exacerbated the problem
faced by private agents of making price-level forecasts to set the terms of multiperiod contracts.
7Figure 2: The Deﬂation of 1920–21





















































over the previous 15-year period. Wartime inﬂation had its roots in a roughly twenty-fold increase
in federal government expenditure from the time the U.S. entered the war in April 1917 to the
armistice in November 1918 (see Firestone, 1960, Table A3).6
When the war ended, the embargo was lifted, and the Treasury and the Federal Reserve had
to negotiate monetary policy in order to protect the Gold standard.7 The Federal Reserve’s Board
of Governors included ﬁve appointees and two ex-oﬃcio members, the Secretary of Treasury and
the Comptroller of the Currency. This governance structure gave the Secretary of the Treasury
a disproportionate inﬂuence over monetary policy, since the ﬁve appointees to the Board were
reluctant to cross the Treasury. Faced with a 25-fold increase in gross public debt after the War
(Meltzer 2003), the Secretary refused to support an increase in discount rates despite an acceleration
6While the war was primarily ﬁnanced through higher taxes and the issuance of government bonds, money creation
by the Federal Reserve System also played a signiﬁcant role (Rockoﬀ, 2005).
7Unlike the Civil war period, in which the dollar was allowed to ﬂoat, the oﬃcial price of gold remained ﬁxed
during WWI. Thus, the task facing policymakers was to ensure that gold reserves were suﬃcient to support free
convertibility after the lifting of the embargo.
8in inﬂation into double digits in 1919.8 However, the Treasury’s reputation was strongly linked to
the success of the gold standard. In particular, U.S. law required the Federal Reserve to ensure a
stock of monetary gold equal to at least 40 percent of the supply of base money. By November
1919, sizeable gold outﬂows put the legal minimum in sight, and the Treasury ﬁnally supported
Board action to raise the discount rate.
Once freed to act, the Board raised the System-wide average discount rate over 2 percentage
points between late 1919 and mid-1920 (see Figure 2). Although an eventual tightening of policy
was anticipated insofar as private agents believed that the government was committed to defending
the Gold standard, both the timing and severity of the contraction were a surprise. The highly
persistent rise in nominal rates in the face of rapidly shifting expectations about inﬂation (i.e.,
towards deﬂation) represented a much tighter policy stance than agents had anticipated. As seen
in Figure 2, the aggregate price level plunged 20 percent between mid-1920 and mid-1921, and
commodity prices declined much more precipitously. Output also declined very abruptly, especially
in manufacturing. As seen in Figure 2, the FRB’s index of industrial production fell more than
30 percent between mid-1920 and early 1921, while manufacturing employment showed a commen-
surate decline. But the short-lived nature of the depression appears equally striking, as a robust
expansion pushed output back to its pre-deﬂation level by early 1922.
The deﬂation of 1920 was recognized both by contemporary observers and by later historians
as a dramatic event in U.S. monetary history. Irving Fisher (1934) was strongly critical of the
Federal Reserve’s role in engineering a “disastrous deﬂation” for which “millions of workers were
thrown out of work.” Friedman and Schwartz (1963) observed that the price decline was “perhaps
the sharpest in the entire history of the United States” and characterized the output contraction
as “one of the severest on record.”
The industrial production and employment measures shown in Figure 2 indicate a much more
severe recession than would be suggested from annual data for the aggregate economy.9 First, the
8The System’s most potent policy instrument was the discount rate charged by the System’s Reserve Banks to
its member commercial banks on short-term loans. The Reserve Banks could request an adjustment in its discount
rate, but the Board had to approve.
9While government statistics indicate a very sharp recession–with real GNP in 1921 nearly 15 percent lower than
in the previous year–the analysis of Romer (1988) and Balke and Gordon (1989) indicates that real output declined
9magnitude of the downturn is obscured by its relatively transitory nature, particularly since the
decline in output and employment began in mid-1920 and ended partway through the following year;
indeed, Friedman and Schwartz argued that this recession was so abrupt that “annual data provide
a misleading indicator of its severity.” Second, the ﬂuctuations in real GNP were dampened by the
stability of real agricultural output (which comprised a substantial fraction of aggregate output)
and hence this measure is somewhat less relevant for gauging the eﬀects of monetary policy during
this period.10
As in the post-Civil War episode, the authorities’ commitment to supporting the Gold Standard
after WWI seems beyond doubt. By the 1920s, the Gold standard was entrenched as both a national
and international norm, and even countries that had experienced much larger wartime inﬂations
expected to return to gold. The high credibility of the monetary regime ultimately served an
important role in allowing the economy to recover quickly once it was clear that prices had fallen
enough. But clearly, the major diﬀerence between the episodes was in the Federal Reserve’s decision
to implement a very rapid deﬂation in the early 1920s, which contrasted starkly with the gradualist
policy of 1869-1879. Inﬂuential Federal Reserve policymakers including Benjamin Strong believed
that it was of foremost importance to reverse quickly most of the price level increase that had
occurred since the U.S. entry into the war; while they acknowledged this might cause a substantial
output contraction, they believed the recessionary eﬀects would be transient and did not warrant
dragging out the deﬂation (Meltzer 2003). Thus, policymakers kept nominal interest rates at
elevated levels even as prices fell dramatically. This departure from traditional gold standard rules
– which would have prescribed cutting interest rates in the face of a massive deﬂation and sizeable
gold inﬂows – helped create a depression in activity through its eﬀect on real interest rates.
2.3 The Volcker Disinﬂation
As of 1979, the Federal Reserve had been in operational control of U.S. monetary policy for about
25 years, even if it remained sensitive to the political climate. The Accord of 1951 between the
by roughly 3 to 6 percent over the period from 1919 through 1921.
10The National Industrial Conference Board estimated that nonagricultural employment contracted nearly 10
percent from 1919 through 1921.
10Figure 3: The Volcker Disinﬂation
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central bank and the Treasury had ceded monetary policy to the Federal Reserve. For a dozen
years after the Accord, the Federal Reserve generally maintained a low and steady inﬂation rate.
But beginning in the mid-1960s, the Federal Reserve permitted inﬂation to rise to progressively
higher levels. By the time President Carter appointed in 1979 a well-known inﬂation “hawk”, Paul
Volcker, to run the Federal Reserve, (GNP) price inﬂation had reached 9 percent.
Two months after taking oﬃce in August 1979, Volcker announced a major shift in policy
aimed at rapidly lowering the inﬂation rate. Volcker desired the policy change to be interpreted as
a decisive break from past policies that had allowed the inﬂation rate to rise to double digit levels
(Figure 3). The announcement was followed by a series of sizeable hikes in the federal funds rate:
the roughly 7 percentage point rise in the nominal federal funds rate between October 1979 and
April 1980 represented the largest increase over a sixth month period in the history of the Federal
Reserve System. However, this tight monetary stance was temporarily abandoned in mid-1980 as
economic activity decelerated sharply. Reluctantly, the FOMC imposed credit controls and let the
11funds rate decline – moves that the Carter Administration had publically supported. The FOMC’s
policy reversal and acquiesence to political pressure was widely viewed as a signal that it was not
committed to achieving a sustained fall in inﬂation (Blanchard, 1984). Having failed to convince
price and wage setters that inﬂation was going to fall, GNP prices rose almost 10 percent in 1980.
The Federal Reserve embarked on a new round of monetary tightening in late 1980. The federal
funds rate rose to 20 percent in late December, implying an ex post real interest rate of about
10 percent. Real ex post rates were allowed to fall only slightly from this extraordinarily high
level over the following two years. Newly-elected President Reagan’s support of Volcker’s policy
was signiﬁcant in giving the Federal Reserve the political mandate it needed to keep interest rates
elevated for a prolonged period, and provided some shield from growing opposition in Congress;
cf. Feldstein (1993). This second and more durable round of tightening succeeded in reducing the
inﬂation rate from about 10 percent in early 1981 to about 4 percent in 1983, but at the cost of
a sharp and very prolonged recession. The OECD’s measure of the output gap expanded by 6
percent between mid-1980 and mid-1982, and the unemployment rate (not shown) hovered at 10
percent until mid-1983.
While policymakers in the Gold standard environment examined in the earlier episodes had
the advantage of a transparent and credible long-run nominal anchor, the Volcker disinﬂation was
conducted in a setting in which there was a high degree of uncertainty about whether policymakers
had the desire and ability to maintain low inﬂation rates. But notwithstanding that Federal Reserve
policy during the 1970s and early 1980s merits some criticism for a lack of transparent objectives,
it seems unlikely that simple announcements about long-run policy goals (e.g., an inﬂation target
of three percent) would have carried much weight given the poor track record of the preceding
two decades. Thus, it seems arguable that Volcker’s FOMC had little hope of harnessing inﬂation
expectations in a way that could facilitate lower inﬂation without sizeable output costs.
3 Policy Predictability: Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence about the predictability of price decline that preceded Resumption in 1879
appears fairly limited. However, as argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and later Calomiris
12Figure 4: The Evolution of Long-Term Bond Yields, 1867–1870
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(1985 and 1993), the behavior of longer term bond yields seems at least consistent with the view
that private agents expected the dollar to appreciate (and prices to fall) by enough to support
an eventual return to gold. As seen in Figure 4, the nominal yields on high quality greenback-
denominated railroad bonds were actually somewhat lower than the yield on gold-denominated
U.S. treasury bonds at the passage of the Public Credit Act in 1869. By that time, conﬁdence was
very high that the government would satisfy its obligation to repay its bonds in gold. Thus, drawing
on uncovered interest parity, Friedman and Schwartz interpreted the lower interest rate on privately
issued railroad bonds as suggesting that private agents on balance expected some appreciation of
the greenback relative to gold. Of course, the simple diﬀerence between the interest rate series
would understate expected appreciation of the Greenback to the extent that the interest rate on
the railroad bonds included a premium for default risk.11
Some evidence from commodity futures markets also appears consistent with our interpretation
that the gradual price decline prior to Resumption was largely anticipated. Taking the futures price
11It is diﬃcult to assess the magnitude of this premium, which presumably ﬂuctuated considerably with the business
cycle. However, for some quantitative guidance, it is useful to consider the period after Resumption in 1879, when
both railroad bond interest rates and U.S. treasury bond rates were denominated in gold. In 1880, the risk spread on
high quality railroad bonds appeared to be in the range of 100-150 basis points. For example, the average yield on
the Chicago and Alton Railroad 7’s maturing in 1893 was about 5.3 percent in 1880 (Macaulay Table A51), compared
with a yield on U.S. treasury bonds (4-1/2s of 1891) of 4.1 percent (Homer and Sylla, 1996).
13as a proxy for the expected price of a given commodity at a date K months ahead, we constructed
a series of forecast errors as the diﬀerence between the realized commodity price and the (futures-
based) forecast. The futures prices are on 4-5 month contracts (the longest maturities regularly
available during that period) on pork, corn, wheat, and lard.12 Given the paucity of observations on
each individual commodity, Figure 1 pools forecast errors for all four of the commodities (yielding 30
observations over our 1871-78 sample period). The forecast errors seem relatively small, especially
given the substantial volatility in spot prices of the underlying commodities: the average absolute
error using these pooled observations is around 10 percent. Moreover, realized prices do not appear
consistently lower than forecast (i.e., the forecast errors are not consistently negative). Despite
obvious limitations of our data – including the short duration of futures contracts, and small
number of observations – they are at least suggestive that agents were not surprised by declining
prices.
There is considerably more evidence about the predictability of policy in the case of the deﬂa-
tionary episode following WWI. One very useful source is Harvard’s Monthly Survey of General
Business Conditions, which appeared as a monthly supplement to the Review of Economics and
Statistics beginning in 1919. Harvard’s Monthly Survey (HMS) interpreted recent ﬁnancial and
macroeconomic developments, and also made projections about the future evolution of output,
prices, and short-term interest rates. While projections about individual macroeconomic series
were primarily qualitative, the HMS did make some explicit forecasts about the likely duration of
the business downturn during the course of 1920-21.
Drawing on the surveys from the ﬁrst half of 1920, the HMS forecasters correctly predicted that
the post-war inﬂation would be followed by a period of monetary retrenchment, and appeared to
have a fairly clear understanding of the channels through which the monetary tightening would
operate. In particular, they argued that the Federal Reserve’s imposition of higher discount rates
beginning in late 1919 would precipitate a fall in commodity prices, followed by a decline in con-
sumer prices, wages, and business activity; but drawing on historical experience, they expected
12Futures prices were obtained from various issues of the Chicago Tribune. Realized prices were taken from the
NBER’s macro history database, and from annual reports of the Chicago Board of Trade.
14that lower prices would allow monetary easing, and promote a vigorous recovery within about a
year.
The HMS forecasters turned out to be surprised by the severity of the monetary tightening,
and by the associated magnitude of price and output decline. At the onset of the tightening, the
HMS commented that “both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board have embarked on a
policy of orderly deﬂation,” and projected in April 1920 that “it does not seem probable ... that
liquidation in the near future will cause prices to fall below the level of a year ago and perhaps
not below the level of November 1918,” suggesting an anticipated fall in commodity prices of only
15-20 percent.13 But in the wake of a 40 percent decline in commodity prices by early 1921 and
depression in business activity, Bullock (1921) observed that he and the other HMS forecasters
”had not expected a (monetary) reaction of such acute severity. We had looked for a return [of
commodity prices] to some such level as had prevailed in the few months following the armistice,
and as late as July expected nothing so drastic as the events of the last half of the year.” Moreover,
the HMS forecasters were forced to revise their optimistic initial predictions (made in the spring of
1920) that recovery would occur within a year as the sharp nature of the downturn became more
apparent. The HMS attributed the severity of the downturn in part to persistently high interest
rates, as interest rates remained elevated for a longer duration than in previous cyclical downturns
dating back to the 1890s.14 Nevertheless, given the enormous price contraction by early 1921, the
HMS forecasters were conﬁdent that prices would soon stabilize (as in fact occurred by late 1921),
and that an eventual easing of monetary conditions would facilitate a rebound in real activity.
Commodity price forecast errors provide complementary evidence that prices fell more quickly
and by a greater magnitude than expected by private agents. Figure 2 shows commodity price
forecast errors for three individual commodities – corn, oats, and cotton – measured again as
13The HMS drew on two diﬀerent measures of commodity prices: a Bureau of Labor Statistics index of wholesale
commodity prices, and an alternative index produced by the trade publication Bradstreet’s. Using the BLS measure
apparently favored by HMS researchers, commodity prices were about 19 percent higher in March 1920 than in March
1919, and about 15 percent higher than in November 1918 (using Bradstreet’s, commodity prices were 15 percent
higher than in March 1919, and 9 percent higher than in November 1918).
14Given that the HMS forecasters saw the adjustment of retail prices to lag that of commodity prices, retail prices
were expected to fall through much of 1921 (e.g., Bullock, 1921), suggesting that ex ante real interest rates were
expected to remain at very elevated levels.
15the realized price of each commodity minus the “forecast” implied by the futures price.15 In the
post-World War I deﬂation, commodity price forecast errors turned consistently negative shortly
after monetary policy was tightened in early 1920, and reached 50 percentage points or higher in
absolute value terms. The average forecast errors over the 1920-21 tightening period are several
times as large as the commodity price forecast errors derived from the post-Civil War data. But
interestingly, forecast errors are generally much smaller after early 1921. This seems consistent
with our intepretation that after a markedly lower price level was achieved, the policy environment
became much more predictable, as agents expected the aggregate price level to remain roughly
stable.
Lastly, we turn to the Volcker disinﬂation, for which there is considerable survey data available
on inﬂation expectations at diﬀerent horizons. Figure 3 plots the median projection–taken from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters–for the four-quarter-average GNP price inﬂation rate over the
coming year. The forecast error (that is, the gap between the forecast and the realized four-quarter-
average inﬂation rate) averaged about 2 percentage points over the 1981–84 period. Importantly,
the inﬂation forecast errors show little tendency to die out, reﬂecting that inﬂation was consistently
lower than what agents projected. The lower right panel of Figure 3 also contrasts the relatively
quick decline in current inﬂation with the much more sluggish adjustment of long-run inﬂation
expectations (as proxied by Barclay’s projection of inﬂation 5 to 10 years ahead, and by the 10-
year-ahead inﬂation projection of the Philadephia Federal Reserve Bank). Taken together, the
survey data suggests that inﬂation expectations were very slow to react to the decline in realized
inﬂation, which we interpret as strong evidence that private agents doubted the ability or desire
of policymakers to maintain low inﬂation rates. This interpretation is consistent with that of
Goodfriend (1993) and Goodfriend and King (2005), who argued that the slow adjustment of
inﬂation expectations was a primary factor accounting for the high nominal interest rates on long-
term bonds that prevailed through most of the 1980s.
15The futures data on corn and oats are from the Annual Reports of the Chicago Board of Trade, as in Hamil-
ton (1992). Cotton futures traded on the New York commodity futures exchange, with the data recorded in the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
164 The Model
We utilize the same basic model to analyze each of the three historical episodes, aside from diﬀer-
ences in the characterization of monetary policy. The model can be regarded as a slightly simpliﬁed
version of the model utilized by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), and Smets and Wouters
(2003). Thus, our model incorporates nominal rigidities by assuming that labor and product mar-
kets each exhibit monopolistic competition, and that wages and prices are determined by staggered
nominal contracts of random duration (following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996)). We also include
various real rigidities emphasized in the recent literature, including habit persistence in consump-
tion, and costs of changing the rate of investment. Given that our characterization of monetary
policy diﬀers across episodes, we defer this discussion to Section 6 (when we present simulation
results for each episode).
4.1 Firms and Price Setting
Final Goods Production As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000), we assume that there is a single
ﬁnal output good Yt that is produced using a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods Yt(f).
The technology for transforming these intermediate goods into the ﬁnal output good is constant









where θp > 0.
Firms that produce the ﬁnal output good are perfectly competitive in both product and factor
markets. Thus, ﬁnal goods producers minimize the cost of producing a given quantity of the output
index Yt, taking as given the price Pt (f) of each intermediate good Yt(f). Moreover, ﬁnal goods










It is natural to interpret Pt as the aggregate price index.
17Intermediate Goods Production A continuum of intermediate goods Yt(f)f o rf ∈ [0,1] is pro-
duced by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each of which produces a single diﬀerentiated good.
Each intermediate goods producer faces a demand function for its output good that varies inversely








Each intermediate goods producer utilizes capital services Kt (f) and a labor index Lt (f) (de-
ﬁned below) to produce its respective output good. The form of the production function is Cobb-
Douglas:
Yt (f)=Kt(f)αLt(f)1−α (4)
Firms face perfectly competitive factor markets for hiring capital and the labor index. Thus,
each ﬁrm chooses Kt (f)a n dLt (f), taking as given both the rental price of capital RKt and the
aggregate wage index Wt (deﬁned below). Firms can costlessly adjust either factor of production.
Thus, the standard static ﬁrst-order conditions for cost minimization imply that all ﬁrms have
identical marginal cost per unit of output. By implication, aggregate marginal cost MCt can be
expressed as a function of the wage index Wt, the aggregate labor index Lt, and the aggregate











We assume that the prices of the intermediate goods are determined by Calvo-Yun style stag-
gered nominal contracts. In each period, each ﬁrm f faces a constant probability, 1 − ξp, of being
able to reoptimize its price Pt(f). The probability that any ﬁrm receives a signal to reset its price
is assumed to be independent of the time that it last reset its price. If a ﬁrm is not allowed to
optimize its price in a given period, we follow Yun (1996) by assuming that it simply adjusts its
price by the steady state rate of inﬂation Π (i.e., Pt(f)=πPt−1(f)). Finally, the ﬁrm’s output
is subsidized at a ﬁxed rate τp (this allows us to eliminate the monopolistic competition wedge in
prices by setting τp = θp).
184.2 Households and Wage Setting
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive households (indexed on the unit inter-
val), each of which supplies a diﬀerentiated labor service to the production sector; that is, goods-
producing ﬁrms regard each household’s labor services Nt (h), h ∈ [0,1], as an imperfect substitute
for the labor services of other households. It is convenient to assume that a representative labor
aggregator (or “employment agency”) combines households’ labor hours in the same proportions
as ﬁrms would choose. Thus, the aggregator’s demand for each household’s labor is equal to the









where θw > 0. The aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate
labor index, taking each household’s wage rate Wt (h) as given, and then sells units of the labor









It is natural to interpret Wt as the aggregate wage index. The aggregator’s demand for the labor
hours of household h – or equivalently, the total demand for this household’s labor by all goods-
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where the discount factor β satisﬁes0 <β<1. The dependence of the period utility function on
consumption in both the current and previous period allows for the possibility of external habit
19persistence in consumption spending (e.g., Smet and Wouters, 2003). In addition, the period utility
function depends on current leisure 1 − Nt (h), and current real money balances.
Mt(h)
Pt .
Household h’s budget constraint in period t states that its expenditure on goods and net pur-





Mt+1 (h) − Mt (h)+

s ξt,t+1BD,t+1(h) − BD,t(h)
=( 1+τW)Wt (h)Nt (h)+RKtKt(h)+Γ t (h) − Tt(h)
(11)
Thus, the household purchases the ﬁnal output good (at a price of Pt), which it chooses either
to consume Ct (h)o ri n v e s tIt (h) in physical capital. The total cost of investment to each household
h is assumed to depend on how rapidly the household changes its rate of investment (as well as
on the purchase price). Our speciﬁcation of such investment adjustment costs as depending on
the square of the change in the household’s gross investment rate follows Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005). Investment in physical capital augments the household’s (end-of-period) capital
stock Kt+1(h) according to a linear transition law of the form:
Kt+1 (h)=( 1− δ)Kt(h)+It(h) (12)
In addition to accumulating physical capital, households may augment their ﬁnancial assets through
increasing their nominal money holdings (Mt+1 (h) − Mt (h)), and through the net acquisition of
bonds. We assume that agents can engage in frictionless trading of a complete set of contingent
claims. The term

s ξt,t+1BD,t+1(h)−BD,t(h) represents net purchases of state-contingent domestic
bonds, with ξt,t+1 denoting the state price, and BD,t+1 (h) the quantity of such claims purchased
at time t. Each member of household h earns labor income (1 + τW)Wt (h)Nt (h) (where τW is a
subsidy that allows us to oﬀset monopolistic distortions in wage-setting) , and receives gross rental
income of RKtKt(h) from renting its capital stock to ﬁrms. Each member also receives an aliquot
share Γt (h)of the proﬁts of all ﬁrms, and pays a lump-sum tax of Tt (h) (this may be regarded as
taxes net of any transfers).
In every period t, each member of household h maximizes the utility functional (9) with respect
20to its consumption, investment, (end-of-period) capital stock, money balances, and holdings of
contingent claims, subject to its labor demand function (8), budget constraint (11), and transition
equation for capital (12). Households also set nominal wages in Calvo-style staggered contracts that
are generally similar to the price contracts described above. Thus, the probability that a household
receives a signal to reoptimize its wage contract in a given period is denoted by 1 − ξw,a n da si n
the case of price contracts this probability is independent of the date at which the household last
reset its wage. However, we specify a dynamic indexation scheme for the adjustment of the wages
of those households that do not get a signal to reoptimize, i.e., Wt(h)=ωtWt−1(h),in contrast
to the static indexing assumed for prices. As discussed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), dynamic indexation of this form introduces some element of structural persistence into the
wage-setting process. Our asymmetric treatment is motivated by the empirical analysis of Levin,
Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005). These authors estimated a similar model using U.S. data
over the 1955:1-2001:4 period, and found evidence in favor of nearly full indexation of wages, but
not of prices (hence our speciﬁcation of prices as purely forward-looking).
4.3 Fiscal Policy and the Aggregate Resource Constraint
The government’s budget is balanced every period, so that total lump-sum taxes plus seignorage
revenue are equal to output and labor subsidies plus the cost of government purchases:
Mt − Mt−1 +
 1
0 Tt (h)dh =
 1
0 τpPt (f)Yt (f)df +
 1
0 τwWt (h)Nt (h)dh + PtGt (13)
where Gt indicates real government purchases. We assume that government spending is a ﬁxed
share of output in our analysis. Finally, the total output of the service sector is subject to the
following resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (14)
215 Solution and Calibration
To analyze the behavior of the model, we log-linearize the model’s equations around the non-
stochastic steady state. Nominal variables, such as the contract price and wage, are rendered
stationary by suitable transformations. We then compute the reduced-form solution of the model
for a given set of parameters using the numerical algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985), which
provides an eﬃcient implementation of the solution method proposed by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980).
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Thus, we assume that the discount factor
β = .9925, consistent with a steady-state annualized real interest rate r of about 3 percent. We
assume that the subutility function over consumption is logarithmic, so that σ =1 , while we set
the parameter determining the degree of habit persistence in consumption κ = 0.6 (similar to the
empirical estimate of Smets and Wouters 2003). The parameter χ, which determines the curvature
of the subutility function over leisure, is set equal to 10, implying a Frisch elasticity of labor supply
of 1/5. This is considerably lower than if preferences were logarithmic in leisure, but within the
range of most estimates from the empirical labor supply literature. The scaling parameter χ0 is set
so that employment comprises one-third of the household’s time endowment, while the parameter
μ0 on the subutility function for real balances is set an arbitrarily low value (so that variation in
real balances has a negligible impact on other variables). The share of government spending of
total expenditure is set equal to 12 percent.
We set the capital share parameter α =1 /3, the quarterly depreciation rate of the capital stock
δ =0 .02 (implying an annual depreciation rate of 8 percent), and the investment adjustment cost
parameter φI = 2. We assume that price contracts have an average duration of three quarters while
nominal wage contracts have an average duration of four quarters, and we set the price and wage
markup parameters θP = θW =1 /5.
226 Model Simulations
6.1 The Post Civil War Deﬂation
While we will attempt to use our model to account for the evolution of real activity during the
latter two episodes – on the premise that monetary changes played a principal role in driving the
output ﬂuctuations that occurred – our objective in applying the model to the post Civil War
deﬂation is narrower in scope. In particular, while a more complicated model with a richer set of
shocks would be required to account for output behavior over the long period prior to Resumption,
our focus here is simply to rationalize why the “secular” deﬂation of 2-3 percent per year appeared
to exert little drag on output growth in the decade following the Public Credit Act of 1869.
In this vein, we characterize the monetary authorities in the 1869-1879 period as following a
simple targeting rule derived from minimizing a loss function that depends on the gap between the
price level pt and its target value p∗
t (which we call the price level gap), and on the output gap
gt. Under a quadratic period loss function in each of these gaps, the targeting rule is derived by











subject to the behavioral constraints implied by household and ﬁrm optimization from the model
of Section 4.16
The solid blue line in Figure 5 presents our benchmark characterization of the post Civil War
deﬂation period in response to a permanent reduction in p∗
t of 30 percent. The weight on the output
gap in the loss function is chosen to stretch out the price decline over the course of a decade, so that
the simulated price level decline appears quite similar to the historical experience (this is achieved
by setting λG = 5000 in (15)). It is evident from the ﬁgure that the large cumulative decline in
prices has little impact on real activity: in fact, output never falls more than 0.1 percent below
potential. The optimal policy achieves this sizeable price decline at minimal output cost by relying
heavily on an “expectations channel”: current price-setters are willing to lower prices today in
16See Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2003) for extensive discussions of the use of targeting rules to characterize
monetary policy.
23Figure 5: Simulations of the Post-Civil War Episode
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the expectation that future prices will be lower (and hence deﬂation does not require a recession).
A notable characteristic of the optimal policy is that it implies a persistent decline in short-term
nominal interest rates, which is consistent with the policy shift exerting little eﬀect on long-term
real interest rates.
We believe that this simple characterization of policy captures many of the relevant features
of the historical environment following the passage of the Public Credit Act in 1869 that were
recounted in Section 2. These features included: ﬁrst, the mandate to eﬀect a substantial reduction
in the general price level, subject to the proviso that the deﬂation would be gradual enough to avoid
a reprise of the post war monetary recession; and second, the ability of the authorities to commit to
such a policy. Admittedly, our characterization abstracts from some aspects of implementation that
were discussed in Section 2, including the operational procedure of controlling the monetary base.
However, taking account of such features would require signiﬁcant complications to our model,
and would seem highly unlikely to change our basic message that a very gradual and predictable
24deﬂation exerts small eﬀects on real activity under a reasonable and well-understood rule (speciﬁed
either in terms of the money stock or nominal interest rate).17
Given the negligible output losses under the ten year implementation window, it is also natural
to inquire whether the 1869-1879 price level decline could have occurred more rapidly without
signiﬁcantly exacerbating the eﬀects on the real economy: did the authorities perhaps become
overly cautious in response to the public acrimony that followed their ﬁrst attempts to deﬂate?
This rather general question about how quickly a deﬂation can be implemented without causing
substantial fallout on the real economy has close parallel in earlier work by Taylor (1983) and
Ball (1994b, 1995), but with the important diﬀerence that the latter authors assessed how the real
costs depended on the horizon over which the inﬂation rate was changed, rather than the price
level. While these authors found that a disinﬂation could be implemented over a short horizon
of roughly two years or less with minimal output costs, our results suggest that a considerably
longer horizon is required to implement a change in the price level; the diﬀerence reﬂects that while
the staggered contracts framework implies little endogenous persistence in the inﬂation rate – so
that it is relatively easy for inﬂation to jump – it implies considerably more price level persistence.
Under our baseline calibration, the implied tradeoﬀ between a shorter horizon for implementing the
disinﬂation and higher output losses can be derived by varying the relative weight on the output
gap (λG) in the targeting rule (15). Two alternative cases are shown in Figure 5. The dashed green
line shows that a value of λG which causes the 30 percent price decline to occur over only four years
causes the output loss to rise to about 1 percent, which still seems quite modest. However, while
our benchmark model allows an inﬂation target to be reduced over a narrow 2 year window with
minimal output losses (as veriﬁed below, consistent with the earlier literature cited), implementing
a new price level target over such an abbreviated time frame causes a pronounced recession (as
depicted by the red dash-dotted line).
These results suggest that the ten-year window for phasing in the deﬂation might have been
17It is worth noting that the optimal targeting rule implies a complicated underlying interest rate reaction function
(see Woodford and Gianonni 2005). But at least for our baseline case of a very slow deﬂation, the targeting rule can
be approximated fairly well by a simple instrument rule in which the ex post real interest rate responds to the price
level gap and output gap.
25reduced considerably without much of an adverse eﬀect on output. Moreover, to the extent that
wages and prices may have been somewhat more ﬂexible in this episode than implied by our
benchmark calibration, the output losses associated with shortening the implementation horizon
would be mitigated relative to those indicated in Figure 5. Nevertheless, provided there is some
sluggishness in prices and wages – even if less than embedded in our benchmark – real interest rates
must rise sharply to implement a discrete downward shift in the price level over a short horizon.
Thus, it is arguable that a short implementation window in the neighborhood of a year or two
might have risked a substantial recession.
6.2 The Post-WWI Deﬂation
We now turn to using our model to characterize the severe monetary recession that began in 1920.
As discussed above, the salient feature was a precipitous and largely unexpected decline in the price
level of about 20 percent over a period of less than two years, and a sharp but fairly short-lived
contraction in activity. Our model simulations in Figure 5 suggest that attempting to achieve a
new price level objective so quickly would precipitate a severe recession even under a well-designed
policy derived in an optimization-based setting. But given that monetary policy seemed far from
optimal during the 1920s, it remains of interest to assess the implications of a large shift in the
price level target under an alternative monetary rule that may better account for the nature of
policy.
Despite obvious diﬃculties in characterizing policy during this turbulent period, we believe that
many of the prominent features of the policymaking framework can be summarized in a simple
instrument rule of the form:
it = γiit−1 + γP(pt − p∗
t) (16)
This rule posits the nominal interest rate it as responding to the price level gap (pt − p∗
t), as well
as to its own lag (a constant term is suppressed for simplicity). This speciﬁcation has two salient
features. First, policy rates are driven exclusively by the diﬀerence between the current price
level and its target p∗
t. This speciﬁcation is intended to capture the belief of key Federal Reserve
26policymakers that continued adherence to the Gold standard hinged on rolling back the rise in the
U.S. price level that had occurred following the U.S. entry into the war. While it was recognized
that real activity might suﬀer in the short-run, it was regarded of paramount importance to reduce
prices enough to faciliate an adequate buildup of gold reserves. The second key feature of (16) is
that nominal rates do not respond to inﬂation (either ex post or ex ante). As shown below, this
helps account for the empirical observation that nominal rates remained high despite an enormous
decline in the price level in 1920-21. This feature of the instrument rule evidently contrasts with
the behavior of nominal rates under the optimal rule shown in Figure 5, in which declining inﬂation
exerts sizeable downward pressure on nominal rates.
The price level target is assumed to follow an exogenous random walk, so that any shift in the
target is perceived as permanent. The shock we consider involves a 20 percent cumulative reduction
in p∗
t that begins in 1920q1. While private agents are assumed to observe the underlying price level
target, we assume that the shock is phased-in over three quarters, in part to match the modest
persistence suggested by the commodity price forecast errors discussed in Section 3. Finally, we
set γi = .5 to allow for a bit of interest rate smoothing, and γP = .12 in order to allow our model
to do reasonably well in matching the rise in nominal interest rates that occurred in the historical
episode.
Simulation results for our benchmark case are shown by the solid blue lines in Figure 6. The
model simulation generates a large decline in the price level beginning in 1920 that is similar in
magnitude to that observed. The sharpness of this price decline is well-captured by our modelling
framework, in which prices are determined by Calvo-style contracts with no dynamic indexation.
The speed of the price decline would be much more diﬃcult to rationalize in a model that incor-
porated dynamic indexation or other forms of intrinsic inﬂation persistence.
The model implies a pronounced output decline that is followed by a rapid recovery, which
is similar to the pattern observed historically. The output decline in our model simulation is
attributable to a sizeable and fairly persistent rise in the real interest rate. The substantial rise in
real long-term interest rates despite little movement in the nominal interest rate reﬂects both that
agents came to expect large price declines, and that policy would maintain high nominal rates even
27Figure 6: Simulations of the Post-WWI Episode
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in a deﬂationary environment.18
Thus, our simulation results suggest that the high costs of the 1920-21 deﬂation reﬂect that the
Federal Reserve attempted to engineer an extremely rapid deﬂation, and that it was perceived as
following a monetary policy stance in which future nominal rates were expected to remain high (at
least for a few quarters) in the face of deﬂation: in eﬀect, consistent with our historical analysis,
the Federal Reserve used the blunt instrument of a severe recession to push down prices, rather
than operating through an expectations channel. Accordingly, it is of interest to consider the
counterfactual simulation depicted by the dotted green lines, which shows a case in which the
central bank is assumed to change its target path level incrementally, and to follow a rule in which
18In an earlier version of this paper, we attempted to account for the eﬀects of the massive decline in government
spending following the November 1918 armistice by including a sequence of contractionary government spending
shocks. We found that the inclusion of these shocks markedly dampened the eﬀects of the post-war monetary
expansion on output. However, given that the government spending declines were concentrated in 1919, they had
a small eﬀect on the behavior of output and prices thereafter. Hence, given our focus on the period following the
monetary contraction of early 1920, we have conﬁned our attention to monetary shocks.
28the nominal interest rate also responds to ex post inﬂation (but is otherwise identical to equation
(16)). Clearly, while allowing for nominal rates to decline with inﬂation would have induced a
more gradual convergence in prices to target, it would have greatly ameliorated the output costs.
Obviously, even more favorable outcomes could be derived to the extent that policy could better
approximate the optimal targeting rules discussed in the previous section rather than a simple ad
hoc instrument rule.
6.3 The Volcker Disinﬂation
A striking feature of the Volcker disinﬂation period was the fact that inﬂation forecast errors were
extremely persistent. Erceg and Levin (2003) argued that the persistence in the forecast errors –
and associated high persistence in realized inﬂation – may have reﬂected a high level of uncertainty
about the central bank’s inﬂation target.19 In this paper, we take a similar stylized approach to
characterizing uncertainty about the inﬂation target of the central bank by assuming that agents
cannot diﬀerentiate permanent shocks to the inﬂation target from transient shocks to the monetary
policy reaction function.
We specify the central bank’s reaction function over the Volcker period as a slightly modiﬁed
version of the Taylor rule:
it = γiit−1 +( 1− γi)(¯ r + πt)+γπ(πt − π∗
t)+γy(Δyt − ¯ g)+et (17)
where it is the short-term nominal interest rate, πt is the four-quarter change in the GDP price
deﬂator, π∗
t is the central bank’s inﬂation target, Δyt is the four-quarter change in real GDP, and
et denotes the shock to the policy reaction function, where all variables are expressed at annual
rates in percentage points.
In estimating this policy reaction function, we utilize the sample period 1980:4 through 1986:4,
thereby excluding the policy reversals that occurred during the ﬁrst year of Volcker’s tenure (as
19These authors argued that inﬂation persistence was not structural, but due to uncertainty about the conduct
of monetary policy. Cogley and Sargent (2001) present econometric evidence that inﬂation persistence is regime-
dependent using a time-varying coeﬃcients model.
29Figure 7: The Estimated Policy Reaction Function during the Volcker Disinﬂation










discussed in section 2.3).20 Least squares estimation over this sample period yields γi =0 .65,
γπ =0 .59, and γy =0 .30. As seen in Figure 7, this simple form of the reaction function accounts
reasonably well for the evolution of the funds rate over the sample period.
Agents cannot directly observe the long-run inﬂation target π∗
t, or the monetary shock et; but
given that agents observe interest rates, inﬂation, and output growth (as well as all of the structural
parameters of the model), they can infer a composite shock φt which is a hybrid of the inﬂation
target shock and the monetary policy shock:
φt = −γGπ∗
t + et (18)
























The inﬂation target π∗
t is highly persistent, and has an autoregressive root ρp arbitrarily close to
unity. For simplicity, we assume that the random policy shock et is white noise (so ρq =0 ) . T h e
innovations associated with each shock, εpt and εqt, are mutually uncorrelated with unit variance.
20In this regression, the short-term nominal interest rate is measured by the federal funds rate, the steady-state
real interest rate ¯ r is set to 3 percent (consistent with our speciﬁcation of the discount factor β), steady-state output
growth ¯ g is set to 2.5 percent, and the inﬂation target π
∗ is speciﬁed as 4 percent over this sample period.
30Given this linear structure, we assume that agents use the Kalman ﬁlter to make optimal
projections about the unobserved inﬂation target π∗
t. The inﬂation target perceived by agents
evolves according to a ﬁrst order autoregression. Agents update their assessment of the inﬂation
target by the product of the forecast error innovation and a constant coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient,
which is proportional to the Kalman gain, can be expressed as a function of the signal-to-noise ratio
(γπ
v1
v2). Clearly, the signal-to-noise ratio depends on the relative magnitude of innovations to each
of the components of the observed shock φt; but importantly, it also depends directly on the weight
γπ on the inﬂation target in the central bank’s reaction function. Intuitively, if policy is aggressive
in reacting to the inﬂation gap, agents will attribute more of any unexplained rise in interest rates
to a reduction in the central bank’s long-run inﬂation target, rather than to random policy shocks.
As argued by Erceg and Levin (2003) in the context of a somewhat simpler dynamic model,
the signal-to-noise ratio plays a crucial role in aﬀecting model responses to a shock to the inﬂation
target. Following their approach, we estimate this composite parameter (i.e., v1
v2, using the estimated
value of γπ) by choosing the value that minimizes the diﬀerence between historical four-quarter-
ahead expected inﬂation (taken from survey data) and the corresponding expected inﬂation path









The estimation period is 1980:4 through 1985:4. The model expectation in (20) is the expected rate
of four-quarter ahead inﬂation that agents project at each date, given an assumed one-time shift
in the inﬂation target of six percentage points that occurs in 1980:4. Our estimation routine yields
a point estimate of (v2
v1) that implies a Kalman gain coeﬃcient on the forecast error innovation of
about 0.10.
Figure 8 shows the eﬀects of a six percentage point immediate reduction in the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation target in our benchmark model. The learning problem about the inﬂation target plays a
critical role in allowing our model to account for the main features of the Volker disinﬂation episode
21We use the median of four-quarter ahead inﬂation forecasts taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters;
this series is plotted in Figure 4.
31Figure 8: Benchmark Simulation of the Volcker Disinﬂation
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discussed above, including sluggish inﬂation adjustment, a persistently negative output gap, and an
initial rise in the nominal interest rate. The inﬂation rate declines in roughly exponential fashion
in our model simulation, with about half of the eventual 6 percentage point fall occurring after four
quarters, and most of it after ten quarters. Our model’s predicted path for inﬂation is very similar
to that observed during the actual episode. Moreover, long-run expected inﬂation in our model (see
the lower right panel) declines much more slowly than current inﬂation, which is also consistent
with the historical experience. This pattern in our simulation reﬂects that long-run inﬂation is
largely determined by expectations about the future course of the inﬂation target, which evolve
very slowly, while short-run inﬂation can drop more quickly in response to the depressed state of
real activity.
Our model does quite well in accounting for both the magnitude of the output decline and its
timing. As shown in the upper-left panel, real GDP exhibits a substantial and persistent decline,
with a cumulative loss (relative to trend) of about 10 percentage points over the period 1981 through
321984. This loss is consistent with a sacriﬁce ratio of about 1.7, remarkably close to the sacriﬁce
ratio implied by the OECD output gap data shown in Figure 3 and to Ball’s (1994a) estimate of
1.8 for this episode.
Interestingly, the model does well in accounting for the timing of the output trough: as in the
OECD data, the trough occurs about 6 quarters after the initial shock. Our model’s ability to
capture the timing of the Volcker recession provides support for specifying adjustment costs as
dependent on the change in investment, rather than following a traditional Q-theory approach in
which adjustment costs depend on the change in capital stock.22 By contrast, Erceg and Levin
(2003) utilized a Q-theory speciﬁcation, and found that investment dropped precipitously following
the initial rise in interest rates, so that the peak decline in both output and the expenditure
components occurred roughly one quarter after the shock.
The ability of our model to account for the Volcker period is enhanced by allowing for the
dynamic indexation of nominal wage contracts. In the absence of dynamic wage indexation, real
interest rates exhibit a smaller and less persistent increase, and output contracts much less than
under our benchmark speciﬁcation. It might be supposed that the additional inclusion of dynamic
price indexation would produce an even larger output decline, and hence improve on our benchmark
model’s ability to account for the output contraction under Volcker. We found, however, that
incorporating this form of structural persistence in the inﬂation rate produced only a marginally
larger output decline in our model simulation, while implying a much slower drop in inﬂation than
occurred in the historical episode.
While we think that the ability of a relatively simple model to account for the broad features of
the Volcker recession is impressive, we suspect that the inclusion of credit market imperfections and
sectoral diﬀerentiation in production could enhance the model’s ability to account for the depth of
the Volcker recession. In particular, a model that could account for the massive increase in default
spreads that occurred in the early 1980s, such as the ﬁnancial accelerator framework of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), might well provide an even closer quantitative match to the actual
22Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) argued that such a speciﬁcation provides a much better account of
investment dynamics in response to a monetary policy shock.
33Figure 9: Counterfactual Simulation of Volcker Disinﬂation under Complete Information
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We next turn to applying our model to evaluate some of the criticism levelled at the rapid
pace of the Volcker disinﬂation and the highly aggressive policy stance required to support it. Our
analysis indicates that this critique would have been justiﬁed if the Federal Reserve’s policies were
regarded as highly credible. In particular, Figure 9 reconsiders our benchmark scenario under
the assumption that agents have complete information about the shift in the inﬂation target π∗
t.
We interpret this setting as approximating the case of a highly credible and transparent policy
environment. As might be expected, inﬂation converges to the new target in a little more than a
year while the output decline is correspondingly much shorter-lived. Nevertheless, a policymaker
placing a suﬃciently high weight on the output gap relative to inﬂation might view this output
decline as unnecessarily costly. Accordingly, the ﬁgure also depicts a rule that responds much less
aggressively to the inﬂation gap; that is, γπ = 0.25 rather than 0.58 as in our benchmark rule. In
this case, the output decline is a bit smaller while inﬂation declines almost as rapidly. Conversely,
34a more aggressive rule with a coeﬃcient of γπ = 2 would only succeed in bringing inﬂation down
a bit more quickly than under the benchmark rule but at the cost of a signiﬁcantly larger output
decline.
Thus, in an environment with complete information about the central bank’s underlying in-
ﬂation target, the level of inﬂation comes down rapidly even if the monetary reaction function is
fairly nonaggressive in responding to inﬂation. This is because the expectation of slower growth in
future prices and wages immediately exerts a strong restraining eﬀect on current inﬂation. Never-
theless, because there is some structural persistence in inﬂation due to dynamic wage indexation,
attempting to disinﬂate too quickly – meaning faster than in roughly 5 or 6 quarters – can still
produce a sizeable contraction in activity. Given these tradeoﬀs, a more gradualist course would
seem preferable unless the policymaker placed virtually no weight on output gap stabilization.
However, this argument in favor of a gradualist policy is predicated on high credibility and
transparency of the underlying inﬂation target, assumptions which seem implausible in the envi-
ronment faced by Volcker. Our benchmark model with imperfect information appears well suited to
examining some of the beneﬁts that might be derived from an aggressive policy stance that accrue
through a signalling channel. A given-sized change in the inﬂation target induces a sharper rise in
interest rates if γπ is large: thus, in an environment where agents must infer policy actions rather
than observe them directly, an aggressive policy stance can help them disentangle policy shifts from
“discretionary” departures from the perceived policy rule.
In this vein, Figure 10 compares the implications of our benchmark policy rule under incomplete
information (repeating the analysis of Figure 8) to two alternative rules that vary the weight on
the inﬂation gap in the same way as just considered above: thus, we consider a less aggressive
response with γπ =0 .25, and a more aggressive response with γπ = 2. We model the signalling
value associated with an aggressive policy response by assuming that the innovations ν1 and ν2 of
the observable φt are constant in our experiments, which has the eﬀect of reducing the Kalman
gain coeﬃcient as γπ falls. Thus, the Kalman gain coeﬃcient falls from 0.10 in our benchmark to
0.04 in the alternative with a coeﬃcient of γπ =0 .25; conversely, the Kalman gain rises to 0.3 with
the aggressive coeﬃcient of γπ =2 .
35Figure 10: Counterfactual Simulation of Volcker Disinﬂation under Incomplete Information
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Considering the same six percentage point shock to the inﬂation target, it is evident in the lower
right panel that long-term expected inﬂation declines much more gradually for the lower value of γπ.
In particular, long-run expected inﬂation is still close to 5 percent even at the end of the decade;
in contrast, under the benchmark rule, these expectations approach very close to the 4 percent
target within about ﬁve years. Unsurprisingly, output exhibits a smaller short-run contraction
under the alternative policy rules compared with the benchmark rule, reﬂecting less pronounced
increases in both short-term and long-term real interest rates. But importantly, because private
agents learn more slowly about the new inﬂation target under this alternative, output shows a
less rapid recovery in these cases than under the benchmark rule, and real interest rates remain
persistently above baseline. Conversely, while a policy that responded even more aggressively to
inﬂation than under the benchmark would produce a larger initial downturn, it causes inﬂation to
fall even more quickly, and hence generates a faster recovery.
Overall, while the less aggressive rules succeed in reducing the severity of the initial output
36downturn relative to our benchmark scenario, these rules also lead to a somewhat more protracted
recession, and markedly prolong the period over which inﬂation remains above target. Thus, even
if gradualism might seem highly attractive under policy credibility for a wide range of policymaker
preferences (provided preferences aren’t tilted toward reducing inﬂation at all cost), a much more
aggressive response might be warranted in cases of low policy credibility.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined three famous episodes of deﬂation (or disinﬂation) in U.S. history,
including episodes following the Civil War, World War I, and the Volcker disinﬂation of the early
1980s. Our model simulations suggest that the relatively robust output growth that occurred
during the post-Civil war deﬂation of the 1870s was facilitated by the highly predictable nature of
the price decline. By analogy, a more predictable policy of gradual deﬂation could have helped avoid
the sharp post-WWI downturn. However, our analysis of the Volcker period emphasizes that the
strong argument for gradualism that is apparent under a transparent and credible monetary regime
becomes less persuasive if the monetary regime lacks credibility: in the latter case, gradualism may
simply serve to prolong the suﬀering associated with a disinﬂationary episode.
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